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This paper outlines those space power capabilities needed to meet future
Department of Defense needs. The most immediate need is for survivable power
systems up to 50 kilowatts. This implies capabilities need to be developed in
the areas of increased size, higher reliability, hardening to weapon effects,
and autonomy - to be independent of ground stations for satellite control.
Future power systems, as in the past, will need to be able to function in
all earth orbits with different requirements for the various orbits. For low
and medium altitude orbits the primary considerations are environmental effects
and ground based threats. For the high orbits such as geosychronous, the
primary considerations are system weight and lifetimes up to ten years. Also as
the mission hardware becomes more critical, techniques for array control and
pointing must be developed which minimize disturbances to the rest of the
satellite vehicle.
Higher power requirements demand hiqh voltage systems. This in turn
introduces new considerations such as more interactions with the space environ-
ment, higher stress on electronic power control components, and more shieldinq
due to enhanced conditions for arcing and corona. Some proaress is underway in
these areas. Now some communications satellites are generating voltages over
100 volts directly to provide power to travelinq wave tubes. There are also
several groups investiaating the interactions of the space environments with
satellite subsystems including plans for flight experiments (VOLT, IMPS/SPAS).
Several high power system studies have been done for the Air Force and NASA
which have also studied autonomy and AC vs DC systems. At what power level do
the AC systems become attractive and at how hiqh a frequency can we operate
these systems? These issues and questions will need to be addressed in the next
few years.
INTRODUCTION
The requirements for future power as outlined for various AF satellite
mission vehicles in the Military Space System Technoloqy Plan, Volume If, fall
into two categories. The first category is in the I to 50 kW range for mission
of a continuous nature such as communication, navigation, surveillance, data
relay and meteorology. The second cateaory is in the multi-meqawatt range for
either continuous or burst power durations and are for other than solar power
sources. Requirements for lonaer life and survivability in varying degrees are
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_Be_e,_o¢_l-s_t_q_ While the power levels do not appear difficult to
a_chi_eve in view of the "large array developments pursued by NASA Space Station
technoloqy, the other military requirements are very challenging and continue to
be system drivers. The development of solar cell arrays should be in conjunc-
tion with other power supply technoloQies such as regulation and control
components and enerqy storage subsystems. The needs of future power systems are
shown in Table I.
SURVIVABILITY
The primary new requirement for future AF solar power systems is
survivability. This requirement is different for each satellite vehicle and
mission and can be approached from several different directions. Table 2
provides a brief history of these directions. In some cases the threat is
directly on the satellites. For a direct threat hardening to withstand exposure
to the weapons environment is contemplated through the use of concentrator
technology . For higher altitude orbits wherein weight is important the harden-
ing may be at a lower level in lightweight solar array concepts.
Active approaches to survivability imply at least two: (1) evasive
maneuvering and (2) recovery after exposure. Both of these require autonomy of
operation independent of ground stations. Autonomy is also needed if the ground
stations themselves are vulnerable and mission survival depends on the satellite
being capable of operation without their intervention. To achieve autonomy for
the power system we need to develop the functions shown in Table 3.
To survive via redundancy or the use of decoys implies the flight of
satellites that can look like active vehicles but can be low in cost and
realistic in signature. Paramount considerations here would be low cost solar
cell arrays.
SOLAR CELL TECHNOLOGY
The solar cells needed for the concentrator type solar cell arrays are
those that can operate efficiently at temperatures of IO0°C (or greater). Thp
candidate cells to date for this are GaAs. Efficiency under concentration can
be 20% or greater at operating temperatures. Future concentrating systems imply
the use of small multi-bandgap solar cells with efficiency in the 25 to 30%
range. Solar cells for lightweight minimum hardening high orbit application are
thin GaAs solar cells to achieve solar cell blanket performance of 100 to 150
watts per pound. These cells need also be able to withstand temperature excur-
sions and the effects of charge build up and arcinq as they emerge from the dark
to sunlit portions of the orbits. The multi-bandgap cells could also be of
benefit here if they can be made efficient without high cost.
The potential use of decoys challenges us to search for low cost, high
lifetime solar cells. Some of the cell types under development by the Depart-
ment of Energy should be considered once reasonable efficiency is achieved.
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Candidates in this case are amorphous silicon or polycrystaline cells wherein
the satellite _ecoy is to have the same observable signature as the mission
vehicle witheut the mission power requirements. Low cost fabrication and
assembly are also needed.
HIGH P_WER CONS!DERATIONS
Satellite power requirements increase for several reasons such as more
functions in the same vehicle, more sensitivity in such missions as surveil-
lance, or hiqher power signal to avoid jamming or power to communicate with
mobile Systems in the air or on the earth's surface. Table 4 identifies
considerations for High Power
The mission hardware on these satellites may therefore reeuire larger solid
angles of observation or greater accuracy to lock on and dwell on target. The
solar cell arrays must minimize the blockaQe or disturbance of this mission
hardware. The demand therefore is to minimize solar array size thus dictating
high solar cell efficiency. Also, pointing of the array at the sun should be
decoupled from the mission vehicle or other means must be used to minimize
disturbances.
_s these power requirements increase we need to develop building blocks for
array standardization. Such modular subarrays should be in the 5 kW power range
and be for easy build up into complete solar arrays. This approach should
provide economy of fabrication using automated production equipment and could be
the first step toward in-orbit assembly and replacements. As the Space Station
and Shuttle utility matures, more Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) is likely to
assemble and service or refurbish satellite vehicles. Modular, easily replaced
solar cell array packages should be a part of these activities.
The issues involved in interactions with the space environment become more
critical as the size and voltage of the solar cell array increase. The_e
effects were briefly discussed in last year's space power systems conference _"
and are presented in Table 5. These issues are being addressed in the Inter-
actions Measurements Platform for Shuttle (IPIPS) programs through analysis and
ground tests as well as flight tests as will be discussed later in this
conference.
CONCLUSIONS
_lilitary requirements for solar power will cortinue to increase at a
moderate rate up to 50 to ]00 kW. Future emphasis for all Deoartment of Defense
hardware will be on survivability. We must continue to search for and develop
technology to react to the various threat and survival scenarios in reliable,
light weight and cost effective ways. The bottom line fer new technology is
reliability and end of life efficiency.
I. Space Power, NASA Conference Publication 23_2, #pril 10 - IZ, P286,
L. G. Childester & J. F. Wise.
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TABLE I. - FUTURE AIR FORCE POWER REQUIREMENTS
0 Survivability ......................... Laser nuclear weapons effects
0 Power level ........................... I - I00 kW (1990 - 2000)
0 Power level peak ...................... 1:10 ratio
0 Orbits ................................ All earth orbits
Low, mid, high, elliptical
0 Lifetime .............................. 5 - I0 years
0 Reduce ................................ Area, weight and cost
TABLE 2. - SURVIVABILITY OPTIONS/METHODOLOGY
Passive .................................... Harden to exposure levels
of weapon species
Active ..................................... 0 Evasive maneuvering
0 Autonomy, sense/reconfigure
Detection/disguise ......................... 0
0
0
Silent spares
Decoys
Dummy vehicles
TABLE 3. - ACTIVE SURVIVABILITY TECHNOLOGY
0 Autonomy of power system
0 Sense damage and malfunction
0 Adjust and reconfigure to minimize degradation
0 Become independent of vulnerable ground stations
0 Load management to meet needs and prolong life
0 Monitor and assess system health
0 Maintain system i.e. solar cell annealing, battery reconditioning
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TABLE 4. HIGH POWERCONSIDERATIONS MISSION CONTSTRAINTS
0 Look Angles, Disturbance
0 Medularity - Size
Activity
0 Environmental interactions
0 Orientation and power transfer
0 Autonomous functions - Switching
TABLE 5. - ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
0 Radiation Damage
0 Arcing/Discharge at High Voltage
0 Atomic OxyQen Erosion
0 Thermal Cycling
0 Atmospheric Drag
0 Corona in Enclosed Volumes
0 Combined Effects of the Above
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